Arguments for Panpsychism
I have been reading a lot of books lately on the subject and here I would like to curate the best arguments for this position. A short bibliography is added at the end of this post for interested readers. There are far more books on the subject, but the few I have gathered here provide the greatest exposition on panpsychism. Arguments of the panpsychists against alternative theories might be presented at a later date, but for now we need to establish panpsychism in itself.
First, to articulate panpsychism as a coherent and philosophically rigorous framework, it is essential to construe its central concepts not merely as descriptive of phenomena, but as functionally operative elements within an ontological schema.
Definitions
Panpsychism is the ontological thesis that mentality—understood as subjectivity, experience, or proto-phenomenal being—is a fundamental, irreducible, and ubiquitous feature of reality, constitutive of the intrinsic nature of all physical entities.
It posits that the formal and causal powers of material substances are grounded in their immanent psychic aspect, thereby rendering intelligible the actuality of causal efficacy and the emergence of complex consciousness without recourse to brute or accidental generation from wholly non-mental being.
Proto-mentality (or Panexperientialism) is the thesis that the most primitive constituents of reality instantiate a minimal, non-reflective, and non-cognitive form of subjectivity, devoid of higher-order intentionality, memory, or self-awareness, yet nevertheless constitutive of experiential being.
Proto-mentality grounds the compositional account of consciousness by positing that complex, unified forms of awareness arise through the aggregation and integration of these elementary experiential units, thereby providing the ontological basis for resolving the combination problem without invoking discontinuous emergence.
Intrinsic nature denotes the non-relational “what-it-is-to-be” of an entity, constituting the categorical ground of its being and underwriting the dispositional properties or causal powers it manifests.
As such, it serves as the metaphysical substrate that renders intelligible the relational and structural descriptions furnished by the sciences, preventing their collapse into mere formalism by supplying that in virtue of which relations obtain; within a panpsychist framework, this intrinsic dimension is identified with experiential being, thereby specifying the ontological content of what would otherwise remain a purely mathematical characterization of matter.
Hylopathism denotes the intrinsic capacity of material entities to undergo primitive forms of affective registration, such that their being includes a minimal mode of receptivity or “feeling” with respect to other entities.
As such, it reconceives interaction not as the operation of wholly blind mechanical forces, but as grounded in a fundamental structure of mutual sensitivity, wherein the responsiveness of entities to fields or influences is intelligible as a primitive experiential event that conditions and precedes their manifest physical relations.
Dual-Aspect Monism is the metaphysical thesis that reality consists of a single, unified substance apprehensible under two irreducible yet inseparable aspects: the physical, as externally structured and relational, and the mental, as internally constituted and experiential.
As such, it secures the systematic correlation between mental and physical descriptions by construing them as complementary expressions of one and the same underlying reality, thereby dissolving the interaction problem by denying any causal commerce between ontologically distinct domains and instead interpreting psychophysical relations as aspectival differences within a single, self-identical process.
Prehension denotes the fundamental process by which an actual entity appropriates and integrates aspects of its environment into its own becoming, constituting the basic mode of experiential relatedness in process ontology.
Prehension reconceives existence as intrinsically active and temporally extended, such that an entity is not a bearer of experience but an ongoing act of experiential synthesis, wherein the retention of prior states and the anticipatory orientation toward subsequent realization together ground the persistence and continuity of being through time.
Non-emergence is the ontological principle that a property cannot arise ex nihilo from a substrate wholly devoid of the requisite capacity for its instantiation, such that any genuinely fundamental feature must be continuous with, and implicit in, the basic constituents of reality.
This functions as a constraint on metaphysical and cosmological explanation by excluding accounts that posit the abrupt or brute genesis of qualitatively novel properties, thereby requiring that phenomena such as consciousness be grounded in the primordial structure of being and preserving the continuity and intelligibility of nature.
Spontaneity denotes the intrinsic capacity of an entity to initiate or modulate its own activity in accordance with its internal nature, such that its behavior is not exhaustively determined by external conditions alone.
Spontaneity grounds a minimal form of agency by positing that indeterminacy in physical processes reflects an underlying principle of proto-volitional self-determination, thereby providing a metaphysical basis for the continuity between fundamental physical dynamics and the more developed phenomena of will and intentional action.
With the definitions established we can move on to the syllogistic arguments.
Russellian Monism is a metaphysical position which holds that the properties described by physics capture only the structural and relational aspects of matter, while the intrinsic nature of that matter is constituted by, or at least includes, phenomenal consciousness. On this view, the apparent divide between the physical and the mental does not reflect an ontological dualism, but rather two epistemic perspectives on a single underlying reality: the physical sciences characterize matter in terms of its external relations and dispositions, whereas consciousness reveals its intrinsic character.
Consequently, Russellian Monism aims to provide a unified framework in which mental and physical phenomena are understood as complementary descriptions of the same fundamental substrate.
Phenomenal Bonding refers to a hypothesized principle or law-like relation within certain forms of panpsychism or Russellian monism, according to which discrete units of consciousness (often termed “micro-experiential” or “microphenomenal” entities) can combine or integrate to form unified, higher-level conscious subjects. This notion is introduced to address the so-called Combination Problem—the challenge of explaining how numerous, individually simple experiential states could give rise to the single, structured, and unified field of consciousness characteristic of macroscopic agents. As such, phenomenal bonding is posited as the mechanism by which a plurality of micro-level experiences yields a coherent macro-experience, preserving both the unity and complexity of conscious awareness.
Opaque and Transparent Concepts denote an epistemological distinction, prominently articulated by Philip Goff, between two modes of conceptual access to reality. Physical concepts are said to be opaque insofar as they characterize entities solely in terms of their relational, structural, or dispositional roles, without revealing their intrinsic nature. By contrast, phenomenal concepts are transparent, as they provide direct epistemic access to the qualitative character of experience; in undergoing a conscious state such as pain, one apprehends not merely its functional role but its intrinsic nature. This distinction underwrites the claim that consciousness constitutes the only domain of immediate and non-inferential knowledge, thereby positioning it as a fundamental epistemic foundation for metaphysical inquiry.
Arguments for Panpsychism
The Argument from Non-Emergence
This argument addresses the origin of mind by asserting that fundamental properties cannot “magically” appear if they were not already present in some form.
Premise 1: The universe is composed of fundamental entities (e.g., atoms, subatomic particles, or “mind-stuff”).
Premise 2: Radical emergence—the creation of a completely new kind of property (mind) from a substrate that is entirely devoid of that property (non-mind)—is logically inconceivable and violates the principle that “nothing comes from nothing”.
Premise 2.2: It follows that the principle of Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit applies; one may then assume that mind is an ontological “primitive” rather than a complex functional arrangement of dead matter.
Premise 3: Human beings and certain animals possess the property of mind or subjective experience.
Conclusion: Therefore, the property of mind (in a primitive or “proto-mental” form) must have been present in the fundamental entities of the universe from the beginning.
The Argument from Non-Emergence (Revised)
The prior argument form non-emergence centered on the impossibility of "something from nothing," but this version uses Philip Goff’s concept of Brute Emergence to highlight a logical discontinuity.
Premise 1: Physical science describes matter entirely in terms of its structural and dispositional properties (what it does and how it is arranged).
Premise 2: Consciousness is not a structural or dispositional property, but an intrinsic, qualitative state (what it is to be the thing).
Premise 3: It is a “category error” to suggest that purely quantitative arrangements can logically entail or “give rise to” qualitative experience without a prior qualitative substrate (a brute emergence would then be needed).
Conclusion: Therefore, to avoid the miracle of brute emergence, the roots of consciousness must be present in the fundamental constituents of matter.
The Argument from Evolutionary Continuity
This argument applies the logic of biology and, as an example, the fossil record to the timeline of consciousness.
Premise 1: Evolution is a continuous, gapless series of phylogenetic transformations.
Premise 2: There is no non-arbitrary “line” in the evolutionary history of life where mind could be said to suddenly appear for the first time.
Premise 3: If mind exists at point A (humans), and point A is connected by a continuous chain to point B (inorganic matter), then the essential qualities of point A must be present in some degree at point B.
Premise 3.2: It follows that there is only one kind of substance in the universe (Ontological Monism). If there were two separate substances (mind and matter), continuity would not necessarily apply.
Conclusion: Therefore, mind or a mind-like quality exists across the entire spectrum of existence, from humans down to inorganic matter.
The Russellian / Intrinsic Nature Argument
This argument focuses on the limits of science and the difference between outside and inside views of reality or ways of understanding a subject.
Premise 1: Physics provides a purely mathematical and relational description of the world (mass, charge, spin).
Premise 2: A world of pure relations with no “intrinsic nature” is a logical impossibility; there must be something that has those relations.
Premise 3: The only “intrinsic nature” we have direct, non-structural access to is the nature of our own consciousness.
Premise 3.2: It follows that should apply the one nature we already know exists which is experience, otherwise one would need to invent a new, unknown and “dark” intrinsic nature for matter.
Conclusion: Therefore, the most parsimonious theory is that the intrinsic nature of all matter is composed of the same “stuff” as our consciousness.
The Argument from Indwelling Power (Dynamic Agency)
This argument bridges the gap between physical forces and mental will.
Premise 1: All physical objects exhibit certain active powers, such as gravitation, electromagnetic attraction, or internal motion (e.g., subatomic dynamics).
Premise 2: “Force” or “activity” is the physical manifestation of what we experience internally as “will” or “spontaneity”.
Premise 3: Matter is not static or “dead” but is essentially defined by this dynamic activity.
Premise 4: Causal Efficacy requires a mental component—that for an object to “act” upon another, there must be a proto-volitional element involved.
Conclusion: Therefore, the fundamental activity of the universe is a psychic or mental force.
The Master Syllogism: The Concluding Argument of a Panpsychist Universe Follow The Above Arguments
Premise 1: Mind cannot emerge from non-mind (Syllogism 1).
Premise 2: There is no point in nature where a division between the “mental” and “physical” can be non-arbitrarily drawn (Syllogism 2).
Premise 3: All matter possesses an intrinsic nature that science cannot describe, but which we experience as mental (Syllogism 3).
Conclusion: Therefore, the universe is fundamentally panpsychist; mind is a universal and fundamental property of all existence.
The Argument from Behavioral Analogy
This argument, used by Fechner and Schiller, suggests that if an entity behaves as if it has an internal life, we have no reason to deny that it does.
Premise 1: We observe that complex, self-organizing behaviors are accompanied by subjective experience (internal feeling).
Premise 2: Other entities in the world—animals, plants, and even “inanimate” matter responding to magnetic or gravitational forces—exhibit organized, reactive, and self-directed behaviors analogous to our own observed behaviors.
Premise 3: By the principle of parity, similar effects (organized behavior) are likely produced by similar causes (internal states).
Conclusion 1: Therefore, it is logical to infer that all behaving entities possess a corresponding degree of internal subjective experience.
Conclusion 2: Consciousness is not an “extra” feature that only humans have, but is functionally linked to how any system interacts with its environment.
The Argument from Mental Composition (The Inverse Combination Argument)
This argument addresses the structure of the mind, suggesting that complex awareness must be built from simpler mental bricks.
Premise 1: Large-scale, complex consciousness (i.e., human awareness) is composed of smaller, simpler constituent parts (neurons, atoms, or “occasions of experience”).
Premise 2: The properties of a whole must be accounted for by the properties and interactions of its parts.
Premise 3: If the fundamental parts were entirely devoid of mental potential, no amount of arrangement could produce a mental whole (as “zero” mental property cannot sum to a “positive” mental property).
Premise 3.2: Mereological Realism can thus be established; in regards to the mind, consciousness is a divisible “stuff” that can be aggregated or integrated into larger units.
Conclusion: Therefore, the fundamental constituents of matter must possess a rudimentary or “proto-mental” property.
The Argument from Spatiotemporal Duration (The Bergsonian View)
This argument focuses on the nature of time and memory as a requirement for physical existence.
Premise 1: Material objects are not just static points; they “endure” through time (Duration).
Premise 2: A purely mechanical, mindless object exists only in the “instantaneous present,” with no connection to what it was a second ago.
Premise 3: To endure, which is to say it has a past that persists into the present, must require a form of memory, which is a fundamental mental function.
Premise 4: For the universe to “keep track” of its own history (allowing a cause to lead to an effect), there must be a “witness” or memory at every level (Temporal Succession).
Conclusion: Therefore, any entity that endures in time possesses a fundamental mental quality that allows for temporal continuity.
Syllogism 8: The Argument from Information Duality
This is a relatively modern panpsychist argument that views “mind” and “matter” as two sides of the same information coin.
Premise 1: The universe can be fundamentally described as a system of information and information exchange.
Premise 2: The “bits” of information in the universe are more basic than “chunks” of matter, and that information is intrinsically “meaningful” to the entity that holds it (Information Fundamentalism).
Premise 3: Information is inherently a “dual-aspect” phenomenon; it has an objective side (the physical structure or “bit”) and a subjective side (the “meaning” or sensation to the system).
Premise 4: There is no such thing as “one-sided” information; wherever there is a physical structure processing data, there is an “inner” aspect.
Conclusion: Therefore, since information is a universal property of all matter and energy, mind (the internal aspect of that information) is universal.
The Argument from Hylopathism (Sensation in Matter)
This argument, rooted in Renaissance naturalism (Telesio and Cardano), posits that for any two things to interact, they must be able to “sense” or “perceive” one another.
Premise 1: Interaction between two physical entities requires that they be affected by one another via interactions such as attraction, repulsion, or collision.
Premise 2: To be “affected” in a way that results in a specific, lawful response implies a rudimentary form of sensitivity or “detection” of the other entity.
Premise 3: Sensitivity and detection are fundamental precursors to sensation and perception.
Conclusion 1: Therefore causal contact is not a “blind” mechanical event but an information-exchange event that requires a receptive (mental) side to interpret the “signal” of the other object.
Conclusion 2: Therefore, the ability to “feel” or sense the presence of other matter is a necessary condition for any physical interaction to occur at all.
The Argument from Internal Spontaneity (The Monadic Principle)
Drawing from Leibniz and Bruno, this argument suggests that the source of an object’s motion must come from within its own nature.
Premise 1: A truly fundamental entity cannot be “pushed” by external forces alone, as this would imply it has no nature of its own and is merely a passive vacuum.
Premise 2: If an entity has its own nature, it must possess an internal principle of activity or “spontaneity” that dictates how it reacts to the world.
Premise 3: Internal spontaneity—the capacity for self-initiated change or response—is the defining characteristic of a “soul” or a “subject.”
Premise 4: It follows that for a thing to truly exist, it must have an inside that is the source of its outside behavior.
Conclusion: Therefore, the basic units of the universe (monads) are not dead points of matter but active, self-contained centers of subjective experience.
The Argument from Participatory Observation (The Quantum Perspective)
This argument reflects modern 20th-century physics and the ideas of John Wheeler and David Bohm, where the “observer” is built into the fabric of reality.
Premise 1: Quantum mechanics demonstrates that the properties of subatomic particles (like position or momentum) are not “fixed” until an observation or “measurement” occurs.
Premise 2: Observation or measurement requires a “subjective” pole—an entity capable of registering an outcome and collapsing a wave function.
Premise 2.2: Consciousness is the variable that collapses the wave function (the Von Neumann–Wigner interpretation of quantum mechanics).
Premise 3: Since the universe existed and functioned long before the arrival of human beings, the “observer” required for physical reality to manifest must be an inherent feature of the universe itself.
Premise 3.2: If “observation” is a physical necessity, then “observers” must be a universal category.
Conclusion: Therefore, a “participatory” or “observational” mental quality must be distributed throughout the cosmos to allow for the manifestation of physical states.
The Argument from Ontological Parsimony (The “One Substance” Rule)
This is another Occam’s Razor of panpsychism, arguing against the unnecessary multiplication of substances.
Premise 1: We have direct, empirical evidence that “Mind” exists (our own consciousness).
Premise 2: We have indirect, mathematical evidence that “Matter” exists (our observations of the external world).
Premise 3: It is more logically economical to assume that these two “evidences” refer to two aspects of a single substance than to assume the existence of two radically different substances (Mind and Matter) that must somehow interact.
Premise 3.2: A universe with one “kind” of thing is more likely and more sufficient than a universe with two “kinds” of things that have no common ground.
Conclusion 1: Therefore, we should conclude that there is only one substance, which is simultaneously physical (on the outside) and mental (on the inside).
Conclusion 2: Monism is thus superior to Dualism.
The Argument from Natural Forces (Magnetism)
Rooted in the work of William Gilbert and 16th-century naturalism, this argument suggests that “invisible” physical forces require an internal guiding principle.
Premise 1: Certain physical objects (e.g., magnets or celestial bodies) display directed, purposive behavior that is not caused by direct mechanical “pushing” or contact.
Premise 2: This non-contact, goal-oriented movement (e.g., a compass needle seeking the North) implies a capacity for “recognition” or “detection” of distant objects.
Premise 3: Recognition and purposive direction are qualities associated with “soul” or internal intelligence rather than dead, passive matter.
Premise 4: If an object moves toward something without being pushed, it must “know” where it is going, implying an internal subjective compass (rejection of Action-at-a-Distance).
Conclusion: Therefore, the fundamental forces of nature (gravity, magnetism) are manifestations of a psychic or mental quality inherent in matter.
The Argument from Infinite Substance (The Spinozist View)
This argument stems from Baruch Spinoza’s monism, which posits that the mental and physical are simply two “languages” describing the same reality.
Premise 1: There is only one ultimate substance (Deity or Nature) that constitutes the entire universe.
Premise 2: This substance possesses an infinite number of attributes, two of which are “Thought” (Mind) and “Extension” (Matter).
Premise 3: Every specific “mode” of existence (a rock, a tree, a human) is a modification of this single substance and therefore exists under both attributes simultaneously.
Premise 4: Mind and Matter are not two different things interacting, but two ways of perceiving the exact same thing (attribute parallelism).
Conclusion: Therefore, every material object is, by definition, also a “thinking” thing or an idea in the mind of nature.
The Argument from Organicism (The Whole-Part Rule)
Championed by Margaret Cavendish and later 19th-century German vitalists, this argument looks at the universe as a unified organism.
Premise 1: The universe functions as a highly ordered, self-regulating system with interdependent parts, much like a biological organism.
Premise 2: It is a logical contradiction for the “parts” of a system (humans) to possess a fundamental quality (consciousness) that is entirely absent from the “whole” system that produced them.
Premise 3: Since the parts are sentient, and the parts are made of the same substance as the whole, the whole must also be sentient.
Premise 4: A “dead” system cannot produce “living” components without those components inheriting their nature from the system itself (principle of holistic continuity).
Conclusion: Therefore, the universe possesses a collective “world-soul” or cosmic intelligence that governs its organic unity.
Syllogism 16: The Argument from Process (The Whiteheadian View)
Based on Alfred North Whitehead’s “Process Philosophy,” this argument redefines “existence” itself as an act of experience.
Premise 1: The universe is not made of static “bits of matter,” but of “Actual Entities” or “events.”
Premise 2: An “event” occurs when an entity “takes in” (prehends) its surroundings and incorporates them into its own being.
Premise 3: This act of “taking in” or “feeling” the environment is a fundamentally mental or experiential process.
Premise 4: Being is doing, and that the most basic thing an object does is perceive and respond to its environment (process ontology).
Conclusion: Therefore, the very act of “existing” or “occurring” is an act of experience, making the universe a collection of “drops of experience.”
The Argument from Causal Continuity (The Mørch Argument)
Derived from Hedda Hassel Mørch, this argument suggests that "mind" is the only thing that explains how cause and effect actually work.
Premise 1: Science observes that “A causes B,” but it cannot explain why or how the “causal necessity” works; it only sees the pattern.
Premise 2: In our own experience of “agency” or “will,” we have a direct, internal grasp of a cause (our intention) necessitating an effect (our action).
Premise 3: If we assume the universe is unified, causal powers in the “outside” world should be of the same kind as the causal powers we feel “inside”.
Conclusion: Therefore, the “hidden” mechanism of all physical causation is a form of primitive volitional or mental effort.
The Simplicity Argument (The Ockham’s Razor View)
Philip Goff argues that panpsychism is actually the “simplest” explanation of the transition from brain to mind, so this is yet another Ockham’s Razor simplification.
Premise 1: We know for a fact that some matter (human brains) is conscious.
Premise 2: It is more complex to assume there are two fundamentally different kinds of matter—”conscious matter” in brains and “dead matter” everywhere else—than to assume all matter is of one kind.
Premise 3: A theory that posits a single, universal nature for matter is more parsimonious than a theory that posits a “magic threshold” where consciousness suddenly appears.
Conclusion: Therefore, we should assume matter is conscious everywhere until proven otherwise.
The Argument from the Intelligibility of Physics (The “Goffian” Revelation)
This is similar in structure to the Russel’s argument presented prior. However the argument here posits that without panpsychism, the universe is essentially a collection of “miracles” because we have no explanation for why matter behaves the way it does.
Premise 1: Physical science describes the world in purely mathematical and dispositional terms (e.g., an electron is simply that which has “negative charge”).
Premise 2: Mathematical descriptions are purely abstract; they describe the structure of reality but not the stuff that realizes that structure.
Premise 3: If matter has no intrinsic nature (no “inside”), then there is nothing to “ground” its mathematical behavior, making physical laws arbitrary and unintelligible.
Premise 3.2: Structure requires a “substance” to inhabit it (Realist Structuralism).
Conclusion 1: Therefore, to make the universe intelligible, we must posit an intrinsic nature for matter; since consciousness is the only intrinsic nature we know, it is the only viable candidate.
Conclusion 2: Panpsychism fills the “empty” equations of physics with the “concrete” reality of experience.
The Argument from Phenomenal Bonding (The “Positive” Combination Argument)
This argument, explored by Luke Roelofs attempts to solve how small minds form big ones by looking at the nature of boundaries.
Premise 1: In human experience, we observe that diverse sensations (sight, sound, touch) are “bonded” into a single, unified field of consciousness.
Premise 2: If nature allows for the bonding of distinct mental states into a unified “subject” at the biological level, this bonding mechanism must be a fundamental law of nature.
Premise 3: The unity of consciousness is a real physical force or law—akin to gravity or electromagnetism—rather than merely a cognitive illusion.
Premise 4: Fundamental laws of nature do not apply only to biological brains but to all matter in the appropriate configuration.
Conclusion: Therefore, the universe is a web of “phenomenal bonding,” where the potential for collective consciousness is a universal feature of all physical systems.
The Argument from the Failure of Illusionism
Philip Goff uses this to eliminate the only other major serious alternative to panpsychism—the idea that consciousness is just a trick played by the brain.
Premise 1: To explain consciousness, we must either say it is fundamental (Panpsychism), it emerges (Emergentism), or it is an illusion (Illusionism).
Premise 2: Emergentism is logically incoherent (as seen in Syllogism 1), and Illusionism is self-contradictory (to be “tricked” into thinking you have an experience is itself an experience).
Premise 3: If the only other logical options are incoherent or self-contradictory, the remaining option—however counterintuitive—must be true.
Conclusion: Therefore, panpsychism is the only logically viable theory of consciousness.
Bibliography
Goff, Philip. Consciousness and Fundamental Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
Goff, Philip. Galileo’s Error: Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness. New York: Pantheon Books, 2019.
Seager, William E., ed. The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism. London and New York: Routledge, 2019.
Skrbina, David. Panpsychism in the West. Rev. ed. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2017.